Boeing delivered 171 aircraft and swung to a $156 million operating profit, but $445 million of that $332 million swing was simply the absence of last year's DOJ charge — core operating earnings were $1 million on $24.6 billion of revenue, and a fresh $280 million Air Force One charge kept defense in the red.
Revenue
$24.6B
+8.0% YoY
Net income
-$444M
+27.3% YoY
Diluted EPS
$-0.67
+27.2% YoY
Operating margin
0.6%
The headline: more airplanes out the door, still not a profit
Boeing's second quarter of 2026 (the three months ended June 30, 2026) was a volume quarter, not yet an earnings quarter. Revenue rose 8.0% to $24,560 million from $22,749 million, driven by higher commercial deliveries and defense volume. The company reported earnings from operations of $156 million, against a $176 million operating loss a year earlier — a $332 million swing back into the black at the operating line.
But the swing is mostly an artifact of the comparison. Per the filing's own breakdown of unallocated items, "Eliminations and other unallocated items expense... decreased by $427 million compared with the same period in 2025. The decrease reflects the absence of an earnings charge of $445 million recorded in the second quarter of 2025 related to an agreement with the Department of Justice." Strip that out and what the three operating segments actually earned barely moved: segment operating earnings were $631 million versus $602 million, up $29 million on $1.8 billion more revenue.
Below the operating line, Boeing still lost money. Interest and debt expense of $600 million (down from $710 million as debt was repaid) and a much smaller "Other income, net" of $79 million versus $325 million produced a pre-tax loss of $365 million. After $63 million of tax, the net loss attributable to Boeing shareholders was $444 million (versus $611 million), and after $86 million of dividends on the mandatory convertible preferred stock, the diluted loss per share was $0.67 against $0.92.
One technical note on that Other income line, because it does real damage to the headline: the filing attributes the $246 million year-over-year decline "primarily [to] higher non-operating pension expense." Non-operating pension expense is an accounting charge tied to the pension plan's actuarial assumptions and asset returns — it moves with markets and discount rates, not with how many airplanes Boeing built. It swung from $42 million of income to $73 million of expense in the quarter.
Metrics
Metric
Q2 2026
Q2 2025
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Operating margin — the share of revenue left after the costs of running the business, before interest and tax. Core operating earnings is Boeing's own non-GAAP measure that strips out the pension "FAS/CAS service cost adjustment" (the gap between pension cost under accounting rules and pension cost charged to government contracts); it is a cleaner look at the underlying business. Free cash flow is cash generated by operations minus money spent on plant and equipment — the 10-Q reports cash flows for the six months only, so that row is a half-year figure ($1,185M operating cash flow less $2,008M capital expenditure in 2026; $(1,389)M less $1,101M in 2025).
Commercial Airplanes: the 737 is doing the work
BCA revenue rose 8.1% to $11,751 million and its operating loss narrowed to $322 million from $557 million (margin of -2.7% versus -5.1%). Boeing attributes the revenue increase "primarily [to] higher deliveries on 737 program partially offset by lower deliveries on 777 program," and the smaller loss to "higher revenues and a lower reach-forward loss on the 767 program, partially offset by higher spending on research and development."
Deliveries by program in the quarter (including intercompany units):
Program
Q2 2026
Q2 2025
737
129
104
767
10
9
777
7
13
787
25
24
Total
171
150
So essentially all of the delivery growth is the 737, and the 777 went backwards. That mix matters: the 737 is Boeing's highest-volume, best-understood program, while the 777 line is winding toward the 777X transition.
On rates, the filing is concrete. The 737 "began to transition from a production rate of 42 to 47 per month with the concurrence of the Federal Aviation Administration," Boeing is "planning for additional production rate increases beyond 47 per month," and it "began low-rate production on a new 737 production line in July 2026" — a line that "must be production-certified by the FAA prior to first delivery." The 787 is now "stabilized at eight per month," after Boeing "briefly slowed the factory in April 2026 due to supply chain shortages" and recovered in May.
The unresolved item is certification of the two smallest and largest 737 variants: Boeing "continue[s] to expect certification of the 737-7 and 737-10 in 2026, including the final certification of the engine anti-ice solution," and as of June 30 had approximately 40 of those aircraft sitting in inventory. Those are finished airplanes that cannot be delivered, and therefore cannot be billed, until the regulator signs off.
The 767 program recorded a $40 million reach-forward loss in the first half of 2026 against $191 million a year earlier — a reach-forward loss is the accounting requirement to book the entire expected loss on a program the moment you conclude it will lose money, rather than spreading it over future deliveries. A smaller charge this year flatters the year-over-year comparison at BCA without anything improving in the current quarter's economics.
Defense: the charges keep coming
BDS was the quarter's disappointment. Revenue rose 13.1% to $7,483 million — "primarily due to increased revenues on proprietary and weapons programs, higher KC-46 volume and the acquisition of Spirit's defense business" — but the segment swung to a $15 million operating loss from $110 million of earnings. Boeing's explanation: "$125 million decrease in earnings is primarily due to higher net unfavorable cumulative catch-up adjustments of $186 million compared to the prior year comparable period... primarily driven by the 2026 reach-forward loss on VC-25B ($280 million)."
VC-25B is Air Force One: a $4 billion firm fixed-price program to convert two 747-8s. Boeing took the $280 million charge "due to higher estimated costs required to complete structural and wiring installation and to satisfy air worthiness certification requirements," and expects "finalization of the contract terms to reset the schedule and adjust the requirements in the third quarter of 2026" — while explicitly warning that "risk remains that we may record additional losses in future periods." The same warning attaches to KC-46A (a further $714 million charge taken during 2025), T-7A Red Hawk and Commercial Crew.
Two caveats on BDS's growth rate. First, part of it is inorganic: Boeing closed its acquisition of Spirit AeroSystems on December 8, 2025, and the defense piece of Spirit now sits inside BDS, so this is not a like-for-like comparison with Q2 2025. Second, defense revenue at Boeing is recognized on a percentage-of-completion basis, which means revenue itself moves when cost estimates are revised — the quarter's catch-up adjustments were $11 million less unfavorable to revenue than a year earlier even as they were $186 million more unfavorable to earnings.
Services: the profit engine, quietly shrinking its margin
BGS remains the only segment that reliably makes money: $5,344 million of revenue (up 1.2%) and $968 million of operating earnings at an 18.1% margin, down from $1,049 million at 19.9%.
The optics understate the underlying business and overstate the margin decline in different directions. Revenue growth of 1.2% is depressed by the Digital Aviation Solutions divestiture, which removed "$327 million of revenue" from the quarter; adding that back, underlying growth was roughly 7.4%. But that divested unit was highly profitable — its absence also removed "$78 million of earnings" — so the margin decline is mostly the mechanical result of selling a high-margin software business, compounded by "ongoing disruption in one of our distribution businesses resulting from the transition to a new enterprise resource planning system in late 2025."
Cash and the balance sheet: the most genuine improvement
For the six months to June 30, Boeing generated $1,185 million of operating cash flow against $1,389 million consumed a year earlier. After $2,008 million of capital expenditure (up from $1,101 million), free cash flow was negative $823 million versus negative $2,490 million.
Read the composition carefully before calling this a turnaround. The filing attributes the $2.1 billion improvement in working capital "primarily [to] favorable changes in Advances and progress billings ($5.3 billion) and Accounts payable ($1.4 billion), partially offset by unfavorable changes in Inventories ($3.5 billion)." Advances and progress billings are cash customers pay before they receive their aircraft — real cash, but it unwinds as those aircraft deliver, and it is not the same thing as earning a profit. Meanwhile inventories consumed $3,859 million as production ramped. In substance, Boeing is being funded by customer prepayments while it builds the airplanes those customers ordered.
The deleveraging is unambiguous, though. Financing activities used $8,513 million, "primarily due to $7.8 billion higher net repayments," and total debt fell to $45.9 billion from $54.1 billion at year-end 2025. Boeing ended the quarter with $7.2 billion of cash, $12.8 billion of short-term investments and $10.0 billion of undrawn revolving credit. It remains investment grade at all three agencies (BBB- at S&P and Fitch, Baa3 at Moody's), and "In June 2026, Fitch affirmed the BBB- credit rating and revised the outlook to positive from stable."
Backlog
Total backlog reached $715,261 million at June 30, 2026, up from $682,207 million at year-end and $618,538 million a year earlier. BCA accounts for $596,724 million of it, having risen $29,434 million in six months "reflecting new orders in excess of deliveries." Against that, aircraft order cancellations in the half totalled $2,777 million, "primarily relate[d] to 737 aircraft," plus $2,089 million of ASC 606 adjustments — a removal of orders Boeing no longer judges probable of being collected, mainly on 737 and 777X. Boeing expects roughly 21% of total backlog to convert to revenue through 2027 and 62% through 2030.
Takeaway: The operating swing to positive is almost entirely the absence of last year's $445 million DOJ charge; on a core basis Boeing earned $1 million on $24.6 billion of revenue, meaning the underlying business is still exactly at breakeven. The real news is operational — 171 deliveries, the 737 moving to 47 a month, and $8.2 billion of debt retired — while the real drag is structural: $600 million of quarterly interest expense consumes all segment profit, and fixed-price defense programs generated another $280 million charge this quarter alone.
What to watch
Boeing does not publish financial guidance in its 10-Q, so the forward commitments here are operational ones the filing itself makes:
737-7 and 737-10 certification "in 2026," including the engine anti-ice fix. Around 40 built aircraft are parked in inventory waiting on it; each one that delivers converts inventory into cash and revenue at essentially no incremental production cost.
FAA production certification of the new 737 line, which began low-rate production in July 2026 and cannot deliver until certified.
777-9 first delivery still expected in 2027, with the final phases of certification flight testing expected in the second half of 2026 and the engine durability fix still being certified with the supplier. The 777-8 Freighter follows about two years later; the 777-8 passenger version "is not expected to occur before 2030."
VC-25B contract reset in Q3 2026, with Boeing warning of possible further losses.
Capital expenditure in 2026 higher than 2025 — already $2.0 billion in the first half versus $1.1 billion — which keeps free cash flow negative even as operating cash turns positive.
My read: the arithmetic of a Boeing recovery is now fairly simple and fairly visible. Segment earnings of $631 million a quarter cannot cover $600 million of interest plus roughly $900 million of unallocated corporate costs, which is why the company still loses money on rising revenue. Two things close that gap, and neither is a market call: delivering more 737s at higher rates (each incremental delivery drops a high margin through a fixed cost base) and continuing to retire debt, which has already cut the quarterly interest bill by $110 million year over year. The risk sits almost entirely on the defense side, where the fixed-price development portfolio — VC-25B, KC-46A, T-7A, MQ-25, Commercial Crew — has now produced fresh charges in essentially every recent reporting period, and where the company's own language ("risk remains that we may record additional losses in future periods") is attached to each one. A quarter where BCA delivers 171 aircraft and BDS still loses money is the shape of the problem.