GE Aerospace grew revenue 21% to $13.3bn on a 26% jump in engine shop-visit and spare-parts work, but margins fell 70 basis points as fast-growing new-engine deliveries — sold cheap to win decades of aftermarket work — diluted the mix; management raised full-year guidance on every line.
Revenue
$13.3B
+21.1% YoY
Net income
$2.4B
+16.9% YoY
Diluted EPS
$2.26
+19.6% YoY
Operating margin
21.0%
What happened
GE Aerospace — the engine business that is what remains of General Electric after the GE Vernova (power) and GE HealthCare spinoffs — reported second-quarter revenue of $13,349 million, up 21% from $11,023 million a year earlier, and pre-tax profit of $2,801 million, up 17%. Diluted earnings per share from continuing operations reached $2.30, up 23%.
The growth came almost entirely from one place: servicing engines that are already flying. Services revenue rose 24% to $9,031 million, and the 10-Q attributes it to "increased internal shop visit volume and workscopes, higher spare parts volume and pricing." A shop visit is when an airline pulls an engine off the wing and sends it to GE (or a licensed partner) for overhaul — the single most profitable transaction in this business. Internal shop-visit revenue grew 25% in the quarter.
But the headline hides a real tension, and it is the most important thing in this filing: profit margin went down while revenue went up 21%. GAAP profit margin — pre-tax profit as a share of revenue — was 21.0%, down 70 basis points (0.7 percentage points) from 21.7%. On GE's own adjusted basis, which strips out the run-off insurance business and pension accounting, the margin fell further, from 23.0% to 21.7%.
The numbers
Metric
Q2 2026
Q2 2025
YoY change
Total revenue (GAAP)
$13,349M
$11,023M
+21.1%
— Equipment revenue
$3,602M
$2,842M
+26.7%
— Services revenue
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Figures from the Q2 2026 Form 10-Q (three months ended June 30, 2026) and the accompanying earnings-release exhibit. "bps" = basis points; 100 bps = 1 percentage point.
Why the margin fell even as revenue jumped 21%
This is not a cost-control failure. It is the economics of the jet-engine business showing up in a single quarter.
GE sells new engines at thin — sometimes negative — margins, then earns the money back over twenty or thirty years of overhauls and spare parts. So a quarter in which equipment deliveries grow faster than services mechanically drags the blended margin down, even though those deliveries are exactly what creates tomorrow's aftermarket revenue.
That is precisely what happened. In the Commercial Engines & Services (CES) segment, equipment revenue grew 30% against services revenue up 26%, and the filing names the culprits directly: margins contracted 160 basis points "from install engine growth (including GE9X), investments, and inflation." The GE9X is the engine for Boeing's 777X — a brand-new programme, so every unit shipped today is at the worst point of its cost curve. Install engines are those sold to Boeing and Airbus to be fitted to a new aircraft, the least profitable way to sell an engine.
A reader should therefore treat the margin decline and the unit growth as the same fact seen from two angles, not as two independent pieces of news. Commercial engine shipments rose 25.5% to 659 units and LEAP shipments rose 24.4% to 510. Each of those engines is a claim on decades of future shop visits.
Segment detail
Commercial Engines & Services — the engine of the engine maker
CES
Q2 2026
Q2 2025
YoY change
Orders
$12,932M
$10,985M
+17.7%
Revenue
$9,731M
$7,646M
+27.3%
Segment profit
$2,657M
$2,208M
+20.3%
Segment profit margin
27.3%
28.9%
−160 bps
CES is 74% of GE's combined segment revenue and 85% of combined segment profit. Within the quarter's 18% order growth, services orders rose 22% against equipment orders up 7% — a healthier split than the revenue mix, because service orders convert to high-margin revenue later.
The volume was only possible because parts finally showed up. Management reported "material input from priority suppliers" up double digits both sequentially and year over year, and the 10-Q is candid that the problem is not solved: "Global material availability continues to cause disruptions and have impacted our production and delivery of equipment and services to our customers... We expect the impact of supply chain constraints and inflation will continue." Supply, not demand, has been the binding constraint on this business for three years, and it is loosening rather than gone.
Defense & Propulsion Technologies — quietly the better margin story
DPT
Q2 2026
Q2 2025
YoY change
Orders
$4,138M
$3,679M
+12.5%
Revenue
$3,443M
$2,978M
+15.6%
— Defense & Systems
$2,213M
$1,981M
+11.7%
— Propulsion & Additive Technologies
$1,230M
$997M
+23.4%
Segment profit
$475M
$403M
+17.9%
Segment profit margin
13.8%
13.5%
+30 bps
DPT is the one place margins expanded, "from increased volume and price, partially offset by mix, investments, and inflation." The faster-growing half was Propulsion & Additive Technologies at +23%, driven by GE's Italian subsidiary Avio Aero. Note a comparability wrinkle: on January 15, 2026 GE moved its Aeroderivative business out of CES and into DPT, and expanded CES to cover the whole commercial engine lifecycle. Prior-year figures are presented on the new basis, so the growth rates above are like-for-like — but they are not comparable to what GE published for these segments before 2026.
Why GAAP EPS is higher than adjusted EPS — and why the lower number is the honest one
Usually a company's "adjusted" earnings flatter its GAAP earnings. Here it is the reverse: GAAP continuing EPS of $2.30 sits above adjusted EPS of $2.02. Working through GE's own reconciliation, the $0.28 gap comes from items that have nothing to do with building or fixing engines:
Excluded from adjusted EPS
Q2 2026 EPS effect
Run-off insurance operations (net of tax)
+$0.13
Non-operating pension income (net of tax)
+$0.13
Gains on retained/sold equity interests
+$0.05
Restructuring & other
−$0.02
Separation costs
−$0.03
The insurance line is a legacy long-term-care book GE is running off, and the pension line is an accounting credit from the expected return on retirement-plan assets, not cash the business earned. Strip both out and underlying EPS still grew 22% — so the story survives the adjustment. But an investor comparing GE's 23% GAAP EPS growth against another company's operating results is comparing the wrong number.
Two further reasons EPS outran profit: the effective tax rate fell to 14.5% from 16.2%, which the 10-Q attributes to "increased tax benefits on global activities, including the impact of the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), which were partially offset by a decrease in favorable audit resolutions" — and GE bought back 6.9 million shares for $2,012 million in the quarter ($4,223 million year to date), shrinking the share count against which profit is divided. Neither is operating performance. Pre-tax profit grew 17%; continuing EPS grew 23%; the six-point difference is tax and buybacks.
One cost line moved the wrong way and deserves naming: adjusted corporate costs and eliminations were −$386 million against −$274 million, a 41% increase that offset roughly a quarter of the segments' profit gain.
The backlog: $210.8 billion, and 85% of it is services
Remaining performance obligation — contracted revenue GE has not yet delivered, the closest thing to a backlog figure in the accounts — stood at $210,790 million at June 30, 2026, up from about $190 billion at December 31, 2025.
Backlog (RPO)
Jun 30, 2026
Dec 31, 2025
Change
Equipment
$32,085M
—
—
Services
$178,705M
—
—
CES total
$179,900M
$164,485M
+9.4%
DPT total
$30,663M
$25,856M
+18.6%
Services are 85% of the total, and GE expects only 12% of the services backlog to convert to revenue within a year — 40% within five years, 66% within ten. That long tail is the point: it is a contracted annuity stretching a decade out, not a pipeline that can evaporate in a downturn. CES backlog grew 9% in six months "as a result of commercial actions and increases to existing long-term service agreements"; DPT's grew 19%, "primarily due to increases in equipment from orders outpacing revenue recognized."
Takeaway: GE's margin compression is the cost of its backlog growth, not a deterioration in the business. Shipping 659 commercial engines — up 26% — means booking a lot of low-margin new-engine revenue today (GE9X especially) in exchange for thirty years of high-margin overhauls. The quarter to worry about would be one where deliveries stall and margins look fine; this is the opposite. The genuine question is not the 70 basis points, but whether supply-chain material input keeps improving fast enough to convert a $210.8 billion backlog at the pace GE has now guided to.
Cash and capital returns
Cash from operating activities rose 39% to $3,258 million, and free cash flow rose 43% to $3,027 million. The first-half working-capital story is better than the growth rate alone implies: inventories released $0.8 billion of cash, "driven by higher output and lower tariffs," and receivables released $0.5 billion on higher collections. A business growing output 25%+ that is simultaneously releasing working capital is converting its ramp efficiently rather than funding it.
GE returned cash aggressively: $2.0 billion of buybacks in the quarter under a $20 billion authorisation approved in December 2025, and a quarterly dividend raised 31% to $0.47 per share. Shares outstanding fell to 1,037.6 million from 1,048.8 million at year-end.
Tariffs: a cost headwind that partly reversed
The 10-Q records a genuine one-off benefit that a reader should not extrapolate. In 2026 the Supreme Court ruled against tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and "in the second quarter, GE Aerospace submitted refund requests and received a portion of previously paid IEEPA tariffs." Separately, Q1 2026 included "a $0.1 billion reversal of a majority of the tariff-related charge in the first quarter of 2025." Combined with the 2025 zero-for-zero aerospace tariff agreements with the EU, UK, Japan and Korea, tariffs went from a 2025 headwind to a modest 2026 tailwind — flattering the year-over-year comparison in a way that will not repeat.
Management also flags the Middle East conflict as a watch item for airline utilisation and shop-visit volumes, while stating it "did not result in a material impact on our operations in the six months ended June 30, 2026."
Guidance: raised on every line
CEO Larry Culp: "Given our exceptional year-to-date performance and visibility for the remainder of the year, we are raising our full-year guidance across the board."
Full-year 2026
2025 actual
Prior guidance
New guidance
Adjusted revenue growth
+21% ($42.3B)
Low double digits
High teens
Operating profit
$9.1B
$9.85–10.25B
$10.55–10.75B
Adjusted EPS
$6.37
$7.10–7.40
$7.65–7.85
Free cash flow
$7.7B
$8.0–8.4B
$8.9–9.2B
By segment, CES now expects revenue growth of about 20% (up from mid-teens) with services growth in the low 20s, and operating profit of $10.25–10.35 billion (up from $9.6–9.9 billion). DPT expects low-double-digit revenue growth and operating profit of $1.6–1.7 billion.
The raise is substantial: the adjusted-EPS midpoint moved up roughly 7% in a single quarter, and the free-cash-flow midpoint about 11%. At the midpoint, full-year operating profit of $10.65 billion on high-teens revenue growth implies a margin close to 2025's 21.4% — meaning management expects the mix drag to ease in the second half as services growth catches up with deliveries.
Our read on trajectory
Three things to watch from here.
First, whether the margin trough is behind them. Guidance implies second-half margins recover. That depends on services growing faster than equipment for the rest of the year — plausible given the 22% growth in services orders, but it is an expectation, not a fact, and GE9X deliveries will keep scaling.
Second, the LEAP durability fix. GE completed certification of the LEAP-1B durability kit with an upgraded high-pressure-turbine blade, expected to roughly double time-on-wing, with full cutover "expected beginning of 2027." This cuts both ways: it is a competitive necessity and it reduces warranty and contract-cost exposure, but engines that stay on the wing twice as long come back for overhaul half as often. The near-term effect is a tailwind to contract profitability; over a decade it slows the shop-visit cadence per engine — partly offset by a fleet that is still growing 25% a year in units.
Third, supply chain. Every good number in this quarter traces back to material availability improving. GE plans to invest $1 billion in US manufacturing and hire 5,000 US workers in 2026. The filing's own language — constraints will "continue" — is the honest framing. This remains a business whose ceiling is set by how many parts it can get, not by how many customers want its engines.
Demand risk looks genuinely low here: a $210.8 billion backlog, 85% of it contracted services, with commercial air departures roughly flat while GE's services revenue grew 26%. That gap is the installed base compounding, not the air-travel cycle. The risks in this name are execution and mix, not order intake.