Palo Alto Networks grew fiscal 2026 revenue 24% to $11.5 billion, but roughly $930 million of that came from the CyberArk and Chronosphere acquisitions, which also carried a $797 million operating loss that cut GAAP operating margin to 6.1% and diluted EPS to $0.40.
Revenue
$11.5B
+24.5% YoY
Net income
$307M
-72.9% YoY
Diluted EPS
$0.40
-75.0% YoY
Operating margin
6.1%
The year Palo Alto Networks bought its growth
Palo Alto Networks closed fiscal 2026 (the twelve months ended July 31, 2026) with revenue of $11.48 billion, up 24% from $9.22 billion — its fastest growth in three years, after 15% in fiscal 2025 and 16% in fiscal 2024. Almost every other line on the income statement went the other way. Gross margin fell 3.0 percentage points, GAAP operating income dropped 44%, and GAAP earnings per share fell from $1.60 to $0.40.
One thing explains nearly all of it: the company spent roughly $24.5 billion on acquisitions during the year, most of it on identity-security vendor CyberArk, and paid for it mostly in its own stock. The filing is unusually explicit about the size of that effect, which makes it possible to separate what the existing business did from what was bought.
The numbers
Metric
FY2026 (ended 7/31/26)
FY2025 (ended 7/31/25)
YoY Change
Total revenue
$11,480M
$9,221M
+24.5%
Subscription & support revenue
$9,200M
$7,419M
+24.0%
Gross margin
70.4%
73.4%
-3.0 pp
Operating income (GAAP)
$695M
$1,243M
-44.1%
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Two of these need a plain-English gloss, because they are how software security companies are actually judged. Next-Generation Security ARR ("annualized recurring revenue") is the company's own estimate of what its active subscription contracts are worth on an annualized basis as of the last day of the year, excluding hardware and older legacy support — it is a snapshot of the subscription base, not accounting revenue. Remaining performance obligations (RPO) is contracted revenue not yet recognized: work customers have already committed to pay for. Palo Alto expects to convert about $9.3 billion of the $21.2 billion RPO balance into revenue over the next twelve months, with the rest coming later.
How much of the growth was bought
Note 6 of the financial statements gives the number directly: since their respective closing dates, Chronosphere and CyberArk together contributed $930 million of revenue and a $797 million operating loss.
Strip that out and the pre-existing business grew from $9,221 million to roughly $10,550 million — about 14%, a mild deceleration from the 15% it managed in fiscal 2025, not the 24% acceleration the headline implies. The same arithmetic runs the other way on profit: excluding the acquired operations' $797 million operating loss, operating income would have been roughly $1.49 billion, up about 20% year over year, on an operating margin of about 14% rather than the reported 6.1%.
The company's own pro forma table says the same thing from a different angle. Treating Chronosphere and CyberArk as if they had been owned since the start of fiscal 2025, combined revenue would have been $12,312 million in fiscal 2026 against $10,486 million in fiscal 2025 — 17% growth — and the combined entity would have posted a net loss in both years ($114 million in fiscal 2026, $37 million in fiscal 2025). That is the cleanest like-for-like read available: high-teens growth, and a GAAP-unprofitable combination at current cost levels.
The 63% jump in NGS ARR to $9.1 billion deserves the same caution. NGS ARR is a point-in-time balance, and CyberArk's entire subscription base joined it on February 11, 2026 without ever passing through the prior-year comparison. Management's own guidance confirms the distortion: they expect NGS ARR growth of 63% in the first quarter of fiscal 2027 (still comparing against a pre-CyberArk base) and 22% to 23% for the full fiscal 2027, once the acquisition has been in both sides of the comparison for most of the year.
Where the GAAP profit went
The decline in reported profit is almost entirely purchase-accounting arithmetic plus compensation, not an operating collapse:
Amortization of acquired intangible assets rose to $638 million from $164 million. When a company buys another, it assigns value to identifiable assets — developed technology, customer contracts, renewal streams — and expenses that value over their useful lives. Palo Alto booked $6,279 million of intangibles from CyberArk alone, including $3,500 million labeled "platform renewals" amortized over 12 to 14 years and $2,537 million of developed technology over 5 to 7 years. This charge is non-cash and will now run for years.
Share-based compensation reached $1,815 million, or 15.8% of revenue, up from $1,300 million (14.1%). Headcount went from 16,068 to 21,921, with roughly 4,223 of that increase from CyberArk.
General and administrative expense doubled to $899 million from $443 million. Management attributes $253 million of the increase to personnel costs, specifically "accelerated vesting of certain equity awards in connection with our acquisitions" and severance under a $60 million workforce-optimization plan tied to CyberArk, plus $56 million of CyberArk transaction costs. The prior-year base was also artificially low: fiscal 2025 carried a $110 million net credit in acquisition-related costs (largely a downward revaluation of an earn-out liability), so the fiscal 2025 operating income of $1,243 million was flattered and the year-over-year swing overstates the real deterioration.
Other income swung by $512 million, from $353 million of income to a $159 million expense. The driver is unusual and worth understanding: Palo Alto assumed CyberArk's $1.25 billion of 0.0% convertible notes due 2030 and elected to carry them at fair value. Those notes are now exchangeable into Palo Alto stock at roughly $211.24 per share, so when Palo Alto's share price rises, the liability's value rises and the company books a loss — $562 million of net losses on the notes and the related capped calls in fiscal 2026. The notes are carried at $1,774 million against $1.25 billion of principal. This is non-cash, and the capped-call hedge gained value at the same time, partially offsetting.
That last item also explains the tax line. The effective tax rate jumped to 42.7% from 28.9%, which management attributes primarily to the non-deductibility of those fair-value changes and of share-based compensation. A GAAP loss that cannot be deducted raises the effective rate on the income that remains.
The gross-margin erosion has a more ordinary explanation. Product gross margin fell to 75.1% from 77.1% on "a decrease in gross margin on our hardware products, including the impact from supply chain challenges, and higher amortization of intangible assets." Subscription and support gross margin fell to 69.2% from 72.5% on intangibles amortization and higher cloud-hosting costs. Since acquired-intangible amortization sits inside cost of revenue, a meaningful part of the 3-point decline is deal accounting rather than pricing or unit economics.
Cash tells a different story than earnings
Net income of $307 million sits against $4,553 million of cash generated by operations (up 23%) and $4,414 million of adjusted free cash flow (up 26%), an adjusted free cash flow margin of 38.4% versus 38.0%. The gap is the non-cash items above — $1,815 million of stock compensation, $638 million of amortization, $562 million of convertible-note revaluation — plus the customary software dynamic of customers paying up front. Total deferred revenue (cash collected for services not yet delivered) ended the year at $14.76 billion across current and long-term, up from $12.75 billion.
Two caveats on the cash number. Adjusted free cash flow is a company-defined measure that adds back $91 million of land purchased for headquarters, $42 million of other corporate capital spending, $164 million of acquisition-related payments and a $4 million litigation settlement. Unadjusted free cash flow was $4,113 million. And stock compensation is a real cost to shareholders even though it consumes no cash: diluted share count rose to 764 million from 709 million, and the fourth-quarter basic count was 817 million against 669 million a year earlier, largely from the 112 million shares issued for CyberArk.
The balance sheet after the deal spree
Total assets nearly doubled to $48.46 billion from $23.58 billion. Goodwill went from $4,567 million to $22,010 million and intangibles from $763 million to $7,017 million — together about 60% of total assets. CyberArk cost $21.1 billion: $2,308 million in cash, 112 million shares valued at $18,488 million, and $265 million of replacement equity awards. Chronosphere (closed January 29, 2026) cost $2,951 million, Koi Security $231 million, and Portkey $117 million. Two more deals closed after year-end: Embrace for $325 million on August 27, 2026 and Console for $500 million on September 1, 2026.
Because the consideration was mostly stock, the company ended the year with $7.9 billion of cash and investments against $1.77 billion of assumed convertible notes and no other meaningful debt. It did not repurchase any shares in the fourth quarter, with $1.0 billion left on an authorization expiring December 31, 2026. The financial risk here is not leverage; it is that $22 billion of goodwill has to be earned back through the identity-security business performing as underwritten, and goodwill of that size is what gets written down if it does not.
Takeaway: Palo Alto's 24% revenue growth is mostly purchased, not produced — strip out the $930 million contributed by CyberArk and Chronosphere and the pre-existing business grew about 14%, roughly in line with last year. The real question fiscal 2026 raises is not whether growth accelerated, but whether the identity business, which arrived with a $797 million operating loss and $22 billion of goodwill attached, can be integrated into the platform at a margin that justifies the price.
Guidance and what to watch
For fiscal 2027 management guided to:
Revenue of $14.10–$14.20 billion, growth of 23–24%
NGS ARR of $11.075–$11.175 billion, growth of 22–23%
RPO of $25.2–$25.4 billion, growth of 19–20%
Non-GAAP operating margin of 29.5% (versus 29.2% in fiscal 2026)
Non-GAAP diluted EPS of $4.16–$4.19 on 844–847 million shares
Adjusted free cash flow margin of 38.0%
For the first quarter of fiscal 2027: revenue of $3.300–$3.310 billion (up 33–34%), NGS ARR of $9.54–$9.56 billion and non-GAAP EPS of $0.96–$0.98. The first-quarter RPO guidance of $20.8–$20.9 billion is below the $21.2 billion reported at year-end, which is normal seasonality — the fourth quarter is the heavy bookings quarter and the balance draws down in the first — rather than a sign of contract losses. CFO Dipak Golechha reiterated a target of 40% adjusted free cash flow margin in fiscal 2028, and CEO Nikesh Arora repeated a $20 billion NGS ARR goal for fiscal 2030.
Reading that guidance against what the filing shows, three things stand out. First, fiscal 2027 revenue growth of 23–24% is again mostly inorganic in the first half: CyberArk only entered the base in February 2026, so roughly two quarters of acquired revenue are still lapping a period without it. The full-year NGS ARR guide of 22–23%, which is measured on a year-end-to-year-end basis where CyberArk is in both sides, is the cleaner signal — and it is close to the ~17% pro forma growth the combined business delivered in fiscal 2026, with some contribution from genuine acceleration and from Embrace and Console.
Second, non-GAAP margin guidance of 29.5% implies only 30 basis points of expansion after a year in which $797 million of acquired operating losses came in the door. Management is effectively guiding to absorb the dilution rather than to a step-change in profitability; the 40% free-cash-flow target in fiscal 2028 is where the integration case gets tested.
Third, the gap between GAAP and non-GAAP is now structurally wider, and worth watching rather than dismissing. $638 million of intangible amortization will recur for years, the "platform renewals" intangible runs 12 to 14 years, stock compensation is at 15.8% of revenue with about $3.3 billion of unrecognized expense still to be recorded over roughly 2.5 years, and the convertible-note mark-to-market will keep injecting non-cash volatility that tracks Palo Alto's own share price. On a GAAP basis, the pro forma combination has not yet earned a profit. The cash generation is genuine and improving; the reported earnings will take several years to catch up to it.
Source: Palo Alto Networks, Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended July 31, 2026 (filed September 10, 2026, accession 0001327567-26-000023), and the fourth-quarter and fiscal-year 2026 earnings release furnished as Exhibit 99.1 to the Form 8-K dated September 1, 2026.