PepsiCo's 137% EPS jump is a prior-year $1.86bn impairment comp — core constant-currency EPS grew just 1% on 2.4% organic revenue growth, with North American snack pricing and beverage volumes both negative.
Revenue
$24.2B
+6.4% YoY
Net income
$3.0B
+136.0% YoY
Diluted EPS
$2.18
+137.0% YoY
Operating margin
16.6%
A 137% jump in earnings that mostly isn't growth
PepsiCo's second quarter of fiscal 2026 (the 12 weeks ended June 13, 2026) looks spectacular on the surface: operating profit up 125%, earnings per share up 137%. Almost none of that is a real improvement in the business.
The comparison is against a quarter that was artificially crushed. In Q2 2025 PepsiCo wrote down the value of two brands it had acquired — Rockstar (energy drinks) and Be & Cheery (a Chinese snack business) — taking a $1,860 million impairment charge. An impairment is an accounting write-down: the company decides an asset on its books is worth less than the price it paid, and records the difference as an expense. No cash leaves the building, but reported profit collapses. The 10-K-level detail in the filing is explicit that the charge was "primarily comprised of the Rockstar brand in our PBNA and EMEA segments," recorded because "the carrying value exceeded the fair value."
Strip that one-off out and the picture changes completely. On management's own adjusted ("core") basis — which excludes impairments, restructuring, and deal-related items — core operating profit rose 4% and core EPS rose 4%, from $2.12 to $2.20.
Strip out currency as well and it gets thinner still. PepsiCo earns most of its money outside the US, so when the dollar weakens, foreign profits translate into more dollars without anything actually being sold. Remove that translation effect and core constant-currency EPS grew 1%. That is the cleanest read on the quarter.
"Basis points" (bps) are hundredths of a percentage point — a 40 bps decline means the margin fell by 0.40 points. "Operating margin" is the share of revenue left after the costs of running the business, before interest and tax. "Effective net pricing" is PepsiCo's own term for the combined year-over-year effect of price increases, discounts and selling a different mix of products and pack sizes.
Where the 6.4% revenue growth actually came from
The earnings release breaks the headline into three parts, and only one of them reflects selling more at better prices:
+2.4 pp organic revenue growth (real growth: volume plus pricing)
+2.2 pp foreign exchange translation
+1.8 pp acquisitions, net of divestitures — principally the 2025 purchase of poppi, a prebiotic soda brand
So roughly two-thirds of the reported top-line growth came from currency movements and last year's deal-making rather than from the underlying business. Of the 2.4% organic growth, pricing contributed about 2 points and volume about 1.
North America is the problem; international is carrying the company
PepsiCo's two North American segments produced $13,611 million of revenue — 56% of the total — and both are struggling.
Segment
Revenue Q2 2026
Reported growth
Organic growth
Unit volume
Segment operating profit
PepsiCo Foods North America (PFNA)
$6,368M
−2%
−2%
flat
$1,342M (−3.5%)
PepsiCo Beverages North America (PBNA)
$7,243M
+7%
+1%
−4%
$1,053M (vs −$639M loss)
International Beverages Franchise
$1,523M
+11%
+9%
+5%
$637M (+19%)
Europe, Middle East & Africa (EMEA)
$4,983M
+10%
+6%
+4% foods, +1% beverages
$751M (+103%)
Latin America Foods
$2,940M
+15%
+4%
−1%
$616M (+16%)
Asia Pacific Foods
$1,124M
+12%
+9%
+10%
$127M (vs $10M)
PFNA — the Frito-Lay snacks business, historically PepsiCo's profit engine — saw revenue fall 2%, which the filing attributes "primarily [to] unfavorable net pricing," with unit volume "even with the prior year." In plain terms: the company is discounting to hold volume flat, and it isn't working well enough to grow revenue. Segment operating profit fell 3.5% on "certain operating cost increases and the unfavorable net pricing." Management frames this positively — the release notes the North American convenient foods business "gained volume market share aided by innovation and affordability initiatives" — but market share gained through price concessions in a flat category shows up as lower revenue, which is what happened.
PBNA looks much better than it is. Reported revenue rose 7%, but organic revenue rose just 1%, with the remaining 6 points coming from acquisitions. Underneath, unit volume fell 4%, driven by "a 4% decline in noncarbonated beverage (NCB) volume and a 3% decline in carbonated soft drink (CSD) volume." The segment swung from a $639 million loss to a $1,053 million profit, but that swing is the Rockstar impairment reversing out of the comparison, plus a 3-percentage-point benefit from a gain on an asset sale — partly offset by what the filing quantifies as "a 6-percentage-point impact of higher commodity costs."
International is where genuine growth lives. Asia Pacific Foods grew unit volume 10%, "primarily reflecting growth in India," and benefited from "a 9-percentage-point impact of lower commodity costs" (the year-to-date discussion names potatoes and packaging materials). International Beverages Franchise grew volume 5%, again led by India, partially offset by a decline in Mexico. EMEA grew convenient foods volume 4% across the Middle East, Russia and South Africa.
Latin America deserves an asterisk. Its 15% reported revenue growth is mostly a currency illusion: 11 of those points came from "favorable foreign exchange translation, driven primarily by the strengthening of the Mexican peso." Organic growth was 4%, all of it pricing, while unit volume actually "declined slightly, primarily reflecting a decline in Mexico." The same peso move added 13 points to the segment's operating profit growth of 16% — meaning that excluding currency, Latin America Foods profit went slightly backwards, and it also lapped "a 9-percentage-point impact of certain indirect tax credits in Brazil in the prior year."
EMEA's growth also needs context: pricing came "largely from subsidiaries operating in highly inflationary economies," where price increases mostly offset local currency debasement rather than representing real gains.
Margins are quietly eroding
GAAP operating margin expanded 875 basis points, but that is the impairment comparison again. The meaningful figure is core operating margin at 16.8%, down 40 bps from 17.2%.
The pressure is in cost of goods. Cost of sales rose 7.4% against revenue growth of 6.4%, pushing gross margin down 44 bps to 54.2%. PBNA absorbed a 6-percentage-point commodity cost headwind; Asia Pacific Foods enjoyed a 9-point commodity tailwind. Productivity savings and disciplined overhead (SG&A rose only 3.6%, well below revenue, improving to 37.6% of sales from 38.6%) were enough to offset most but not all of it.
Below the operating line, tax is now a headwind. The core effective tax rate was approximately 22.0% this quarter versus roughly 20.8% a year ago, a change management links to global minimum tax regulations. That roughly 1.2-point increase costs about a point of core EPS growth on its own — part of why core EPS grew 4% while core operating profit grew 4% and constant-currency EPS grew only 1%.
The poppi contingent payment is being written down
A detail worth flagging for earnings quality. When PepsiCo bought poppi, it agreed to pay an extra $300 million if the brand hit certain performance milestones by the third quarter of 2027 — a "contingent consideration" liability carried on the balance sheet at fair value. As of June 13, 2026 that liability was marked at $117 million, reflecting fair value decreases of $45 million in the quarter and $161 million year to date.
Those reductions are recorded as credits inside selling, general and administrative expenses — that is, they increase reported profit. Two things follow: PepsiCo now thinks poppi is materially less likely to hit its targets, and $161 million of the year-to-date SG&A line is a non-operating mark-to-market benefit rather than the business getting cheaper to run. (Core EPS does adjust for acquisition-related charges and credits, so the adjusted figures are not flattered by this; reported SG&A is.)
Cash flow: better, but seasonal
Year to date (24 weeks), operating cash flow was $2,365 million versus $996 million a year earlier, and free cash flow — operating cash flow minus capital spending, plus proceeds from asset sales — swung to positive $1,170 million from negative $342 million. Capital spending fell to $1,266 million from $1,507 million.
That improvement is real but should not be annualized: PepsiCo's cash generation is heavily weighted to the second half. The company paid $3,914 million in dividends and repurchased $479 million of stock in the first half, well in excess of free cash flow so far.
Guidance: unchanged, and the quarter is tracking to the low end
PepsiCo affirmed its full-year fiscal 2026 guidance:
Organic revenue growth of 2% to 4%
Core constant-currency EPS growth of 4% to 6%
Core annual effective tax rate of approximately 22%
Capital spending below 5% of net revenue
Free cash flow conversion of at least 80%
Total cash returns to shareholders of approximately $8.9 billion ($7.9 billion dividends, $1.0 billion buybacks)
Management also continues to expect about 1 percentage point of currency tailwind to reported revenue and core EPS, and about 1 point of revenue contribution from 2025 acquisitions — which together imply reported net revenue growth of 4–6% and core EPS growth of 5–7%.
Two things about that. First, organic revenue growth of 2.4% in the quarter and 2.5% year to date sits at the bottom of the 2–4% range, and the swing factor is North America, where volumes are negative in beverages and pricing is negative in snacks. Second, core constant-currency EPS grew 1% in the quarter and 3% year to date against full-year guidance of 4–6% — so the guidance requires a visible acceleration in the back half. The most plausible sources are the commodity relief already appearing in Asia Pacific Foods spreading to other segments, easier comparisons, and productivity savings, but none of that is yet in the reported numbers. Note also that PepsiCo has been reporting actual currency benefits of 2.2 points against a full-year assumption of roughly 1 point; if the dollar firms from here, reported growth loses a cushion that flattered this quarter.
Takeaway: Ignore the 137% EPS headline — it exists only because last year's quarter absorbed a $1.86 billion brand write-down. The number that matters is core constant-currency EPS growth of 1%, on organic revenue growth of 2.4% and a core operating margin down 40 basis points. PepsiCo's North American business, 56% of revenue, is shrinking in snacks and losing volume in beverages, and international growth plus a weak dollar are what's holding the consolidated figures together.
Our read on trajectory
This is a business whose reported results are currently being carried by three things that are not operating improvements: a favorable currency translation effect, the poppi acquisition, and a prior-year write-down that makes the comparison flattering. All three fade. The acquisition contribution laps out after 2026, the currency benefit reverses if the dollar strengthens, and the impairment comparison is a one-quarter effect.
What's left is the underlying question: can PepsiCo get North American volumes growing again without giving away price? Right now the answer is no — snacks volume is flat only because pricing turned negative, and beverage volumes are down 4%. The "affordability initiatives" management cites are the mechanism, and the revenue line shows what they cost. Against that, the international businesses are performing genuinely well on volume, particularly in India, and the commodity cycle appears to be turning helpful in at least one segment.
The affirmed guidance is achievable but not comfortable. It requires the second half to outrun the first on the metric management itself says is cleanest, and the burden falls on the half of the company that is currently going backwards. We would watch two numbers in Q3: PFNA effective net pricing returning to positive without losing volume, and PBNA unit volume decline narrowing from −4%. If neither improves, the 2–4% organic range is more likely to be met at 2% than 4%, and the core constant-currency EPS guidance becomes the harder of the two to hit.