Anfield Energy Inc. (AEC) Q2 2026 Earnings: Revenue CAD 745K
AEC — Q2 2026 Financial Report Analysis
Q2 · Fiscal year 2026 · Published by Pham Hop
Anfield Energy's Q2 2026 net loss doubled to C$8.98M as mine-restart work ramped up; first revenue (C$0.74M) came from buying its COO's consulting firm, and cash fell to C$1.80M with negative working capital.
Revenue
CAD 745K
Net income
-CAD 9.0M
Diluted EPS
CAD -0.49
Overview
Anfield Energy is trying to restart uranium and vanadium production in Utah and Colorado, built around the Shootaring Canyon Mill (targeted to restart in 2027) and the Velvet-Wood mine that would feed it. It does not sell uranium yet. In the second quarter of 2026 (April to June) its net loss roughly doubled to C$8.98 million from C$4.33 million as it hired a mine workforce, ramped up field work and paid for its new Nasdaq profile. It also booked its first revenue, C$0.74 million, but that came from consulting, not uranium: in May Anfield bought BRS Inc., the engineering firm owned by its own Chief Operating Officer. The number that matters most is on the balance sheet. At June 30 the company had C$1.80 million of cash and slightly more short-term bills than short-term assets, after spending C$15.2 million in the first half. It raised about US$6.86 million more in July.
All figures are in Canadian dollars (C$) unless marked US$, as the company reports them under IFRS (the international accounting rules Canadian companies use).
At a glance
Net loss of C$8.98M, up 107% from a year ago. Operating expenses doubled to C$7.54M as the company moved from paperwork to physical work at its mines. About C$2.2M of the loss did not cost cash: stock awards to staff (C$0.93M) and shares and warrants given to its lender (C$1.28M).
C$1.80M of cash at June 30, down from C$3.35M at the end of 2025. Working capital, meaning short-term assets minus bills due within a year, turned negative at –C$0.32M, from +C$3.97M in December. The company cannot pay for itself; it depends on selling new shares.
25% more shares in seven and a half months. Shares outstanding went from 15.94M at December 31 to 19.95M by August 14, through three share sales. The latest, in July, was priced at US$4.00, below the US$4.46 paid in January and February.
Q2 2026 results
Metric
Q2 2026
Q2 2025
YoY Change
Revenue (BRS consulting, from May 8)
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C$0.74M
nil
n/m
Gross profit
C$0.56M
nil
n/m
Exploration & evaluation spending (expensed)
C$3.28M
C$1.92M
+70.8%
Total operating expenses
C$7.54M
C$3.76M
+100.4%
Net loss
C$(8.98)M
C$(4.33)M
loss 107.5% wider
Loss per share (basic & diluted)
C$(0.49)
C$(0.28)
loss 75% wider
Cash at period end
C$1.80M
C$10.99M
–83.6%
Working capital
C$(0.32)M
C$10.87M
turned negative
n/m = not meaningful. The loss per share rose less than the loss because the average share count grew 19% to 18.23M from 15.32M.
Six months to June 30: net loss C$16.03M (2025: C$7.10M). Cash used by day-to-day operations was C$8.97M (2025: C$5.85M). Investing used another C$6.25M, mostly C$2.95M of equipment, the C$2.05M first payment for BRS and C$1.02M (US$0.75M) for the Golden Eagle property.
Where the money went
Because Anfield has no mine in production yet, most of its exploration and site costs go straight through the income statement as expenses rather than being recorded as an asset. That makes the loss a fair measure of how busy the company is. The MD&A, the management commentary filed with the results, lists what drove the increase:
Exploration and evaluation spending rose C$1.36M to C$3.28M. Management puts it down to higher salaries and wages (+C$0.57M), sundry field costs (+C$0.53M) and license, filing and insurance costs (+C$0.46M), partly offset by C$0.52M less consulting. Over the half-year, the Utah uranium properties cost C$3.94M and Colorado C$2.49M.
A company payroll that didn't exist a year ago: C$0.89M, "as a result of the employment of new employees in Q4 of 2025."
Share-based compensation of C$0.93M (nil a year ago), from restricted stock units (shares promised to staff) granted in Q4 2025 that are now vesting.
Head-office costs went up across the board: consulting fees +C$0.60M (tied to "efforts to restart the mill and mines"), general and administrative +C$0.39M (mostly travel and vehicles), insurance +C$0.28M (higher directors-and-officers, vehicle and liability premiums), professional fees +C$0.20M (legal).
A foreign-exchange swing that helped: a C$0.26M gain this quarter against a C$0.65M loss a year ago. It comes from revaluing US-dollar cash, bills and debt, and says nothing about how the business performed.
Below operating costs sits a one-off C$1.28M "compensation expense". This is the fair value of 50,000 shares and 180,085 warrants (rights to buy shares at C$8.11) that Anfield gave its lender, Extract Capital, in April for agreeing to the BRS acquisition. It costs no cash, but it is real dilution. Interest and accretion on the loan (the gradual write-up of the discounted debt towards what will actually be repaid) added C$0.56M.
The BRS acquisition: revenue, but from a related party
On May 8 Anfield closed its purchase of BRS Inc., a mining, geology and engineering consultancy. BRS is controlled by Anfield's COO, Douglas Beahm, who is also the "qualified person" (the engineer who signs off the technical disclosure) on its projects and co-author of its May 2026 economic study of the mines. The price is US$5.0M in cash: US$1.5M at closing, US$1.5M in May 2027 and US$2.0M in May 2028.
What Anfield got for its money: C$0.42M of cash, C$0.59M of receivables, C$0.51M of vehicles and office equipment and a few other items. The other C$4.70M of the C$6.16M price is booked as goodwill, the accounting label for the part of a purchase price not backed by identifiable assets. The allocation is preliminary.
Contribution so far: C$0.74M of revenue and C$0.56M of gross profit from May 8 to June 30. After its own overheads, the consulting segment made a small operating loss of C$0.10M.
Full half-year revenue of C$2.36M on the filing's own measure (January to June), so BRS is small next to Anfield's roughly C$7M-a-quarter cost base.
One customer accounts for 69% of revenue and of receivables.
Anfield's case for the deal is lower exploration costs, since it had been paying BRS for engineering work anyway. The filing shows consulting inside exploration spending falling C$0.52M year on year in Q2. Still, this was a US$5.0M payment to a senior officer, mostly for goodwill, by a company that ended the quarter with C$1.8M in the bank.
What the headline numbers hide
There is no profit, so earnings quality is really a question of cash. The first-half cash burn from operations (C$8.97M) was smaller than the net loss (C$16.03M). The gap is mostly costs that don't use cash: stock awards (C$2.27M), the lender's shares and warrants (C$1.28M), loan accretion and interest (C$1.09M) and a C$1.39M non-cash exchange-rate adjustment. Add C$6.25M of investing, and the company spent C$15.2M in six months against C$13.8M raised from share sales.
Suppliers are being paid more slowly. Accounts payable rose to C$2.25M from C$1.24M in December, and the increase in payables and related-party balances supported first-half operating cash flow by C$2.51M. That is not a crisis, but the burn would have looked worse without it.
Most of the assets are not available to spend. Of C$95.1M in total assets, C$17.6M is reclamation bonds (money held as security for eventual cleanup) and C$40.4M is capitalized mineral properties. Liabilities of C$45.9M include C$24.97M for future cleanup obligations and a lender loan of C$13.73M (US$9.66M). That loan charges an effective 13.9%–22.5% once its warrants and discounts are counted, and is repayable in September 2028 (C$20.31M contractual).
A US$10M claim with no provision. A plaintiff in arbitration is seeking 125,000 pounds of uranium, or about US$10M, over a 2018–19 asset purchase and supply agreement. Anfield argues a co-defendant is responsible and has recorded no liability because it "is not able to evaluate the likelihood" of losing. At the June 30 exchange rate that is about C$14M, or roughly 29% of the company's C$49.2M book equity, making it the largest off-balance-sheet risk in the filing.
A stale sentence in the risk section. The MD&A still says the company "has no source of revenue other than interest income," although the same filing reports BRS consulting revenue. It is minor, but it suggests the risk disclosure was carried over rather than updated.
No guidance to compare against. As a pre-production miner Anfield gives no financial guidance, only project timelines (below).
Takeaway: This quarter's loss is less important than the balance sheet: C$1.8M of cash, negative working capital, and a US$1.5M BRS payment and a 2027 mill restart still to fund. Anfield will need to keep selling shares at whatever price the market offers until Velvet-Wood ore reaches Shootaring. The July raise at US$4.00, below January's US$4.46, shows what that costs existing shareholders.
What to watch next
Funding. The July 31 offering raised US$6.86M gross, about C$9.7M at the June 30 exchange rate used in the filing. That is less than the C$15.2M that went out in the first half. The Q3 results, due around mid-November if the company files on its usual timetable, will show how long it lasts. Another raise before the mill restarts would be no surprise.
Permits and site progress since quarter-end. In a September 15 release, Colorado's mining regulator (DRMS) found the JD-8 mine permit application complete and recommended approval, with the state board's hearing set for October 14–15, 2026. At Velvet-Wood, the first underground blast in nearly 40 years took place in late August, and the company is targeting treated-water discharge, the step that lets it pump the old workings dry, for the second week of November.
The mill. Utah is still reviewing the Shootaring Canyon restart application, which it accepted as complete in July 2024. Management is targeting a 2027 restart. Until the mill runs, the only revenue is BRS consulting.
Our view. The operating plan is moving on schedule: permits are advancing and equipment is on site. But costs have stepped up to about C$7–9M of net loss a quarter before any uranium is sold, and funding is the constraint. For shareholders, the key questions for the next two quarters are the price of each new share sale and how the US$10M arbitration is resolved, more than any drill result.