BLIV — H1 2026 Financial Report Analysis
H1 (Interim) · Fiscal year 2026 · Published by Pham Hop
BeLive's H1 2026 revenue rose 88% to S$659,389 on new white-label installations, and its net loss shrank to S$1.42 million mainly because last year's IPO share charge fell away; cash stands at S$7.11 million.
- Revenue
- SGD 659K
- +88.4% YoY
- Net income
- -SGD 1.4M
- +72.8% YoY
- Diluted EPS
- -SGD 0.13
- +88.3% YoY
- Operating margin
- -227.5%
This period vs a year ago
- Same period last year
- This period
Year-ago figures (≈) are worked out from the growth rate the company reported. Each row has its own scale.
Overview
BeLive Holdings, a Singapore-based maker of live-streaming and "shoppable video" software for retailers and online marketplaces, nearly doubled its revenue in the first half of 2026: S$659,389 for the six months to June 30, up 88.4% from S$350,045 a year earlier. Management attributes the growth "primarily" to "new White Label clients and expansion deals", meaning custom-built versions of its platform for individual customers. The net loss shrank from S$5.23 million to S$1.42 million, but most of that improvement comes from a one-off in the prior year: the first half of 2025 carried S$2.79 million of share-based payment expense tied to the April 2025 IPO, and nothing comparable this year. All figures are in Singapore dollars and unaudited.
At a glance
- Revenue +88.4% to S$659,389. Growth came mostly from one-time installation fees (up 94.5%), not from recurring subscriptions (up 4.5%).
- Net loss S$1.42 million vs S$5.23 million. Strip out the prior year's S$2.79 million IPO-related share-based payment and S$325,411 of currency losses, and the underlying loss narrowed by about a third (S$2.11 million to S$1.41 million).
- Cash S$7.11 million, down S$1.46 million in six months. At this half's pace that covers a little over two years, but the filing still flags a "material uncertainty" about the company's ability to continue as a going concern.
Results summary
| Metric | H1 2026 | H1 2025 | YoY Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | S$659,389 | S$350,045 | +88.4% |
| Gross profit | S$201,766 | S$39,766 | +407% |
| Gross margin | 30.6% | 11.4% | +19.2 pts |
| Operating loss (before interest and grant income) | -S$1,499,865 | -S$5,276,708 | Loss narrowed 71.6% |
| Operating margin | -227.5% | -1,507.4% | — |
| Net loss | -S$1,419,055 | -S$5,225,296 | Loss narrowed 72.8% |
| Diluted loss per share | -S$0.13 | -S$1.11 | Loss narrowed 88.3% |
| Net cash used in operations | -S$1,528,674 | -S$2,682,635 | Outflow down 43.0% |
| Cash and equivalents (period-end) | S$7,114,557 | S$8,577,947 (Dec 31, 2025) | -17.1% vs year-end |
Gross margin is the share of revenue left after the direct cost of delivering the service (servers, developers, infrastructure). Operating margin here is gross profit minus marketing and administrative costs, divided by revenue: deeply negative because BeLive spends roughly S$2.58 in marketing and administrative overheads for every S$1 of revenue. The per-share loss fell faster than the net loss because the weighted share count more than doubled (4,696,733 to 10,864,802) after the IPO and the conversion of pre-IPO instruments.
Where the revenue came from
| Revenue line | H1 2026 | H1 2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Installation fees | S$383,936 | S$197,422 | +94.5% |
| Subscription fees | S$138,609 | S$132,645 | +4.5% |
| Server fees | S$29,821 | S$19,978 | +49.3% |
| Content production (BeLive AI Studios) | S$88,023 | — | new |
| Campaign fees | S$3,000 | — | new |
| Miscellaneous (point in time) | S$16,000 | — | new |
| Total | S$659,389 | S$350,045 | +88.4% |
Installation fees, charged to set up a customized platform, made up 58% of revenue and accounted for 60% of the S$309,344 increase. Subscription and server fees, the parts that recur as long as a client keeps using the platform, grew only S$15,807 combined, so their share of revenue fell from 43.6% to 25.5%. The new content-production arm, BeLive AI Studios (set up in July 2025 to make microdramas and branded video), added S$88,023, or 13% of revenue. The enterprise "White Label" product line was 64% of revenue, down from 69%.
Cost of sales rose 47.5% to S$457,623, slower than revenue, which is what lifted gross margin to 30.6%. The filing ties the increase to "new clients needing their own infrastructure" and higher server usage.
What the headline numbers hide
- The big drop in the loss is mostly a prior-year one-off. Administrative expenses fell 69% to S$1,615,150, and the filing explains the fall as "primarily due to the absence of share-based payment expenses during the period (2025: approximately S$2,793,600) and a decrease in exchange losses of approximately S$317,600." Share-based payment is a non-cash expense for shares or options granted to staff and advisers, here tied to the IPO. Removing both items, administrative costs still fell about 25.5% (S$2.16 million to S$1.61 million), even though employee costs rose 17.7% to S$726,200, so there is some genuine cost improvement, but it is far smaller than the headline suggests.
- Interest income is propping up the bottom line. Other income included S$74,212 of interest earned on the IPO cash (nil a year ago), while government grants fell from S$52,661 to S$7,594. That interest shrinks as the cash pile is spent.
- Cash burn is real and steady. The company used S$1,528,674 in operations, close to its S$1,419,055 accounting loss, so the loss is a fair guide to the cash going out. The cash balance fell from S$8.58 million to S$7.11 million. Management says it has enough working capital for at least 12 months, yet the accounting-policy note also states the loss "indicate[s] the existence of a material uncertainty that may cast significant doubt on the Company's ability to continue as a going concern." That is a standard but serious warning, and readers should weigh both statements.
- Receivables grew and are mostly overdue. Gross trade receivables rose from S$184,206 at December 31 to S$328,161 at June 30, a 78% jump in six months that roughly tracks revenue growth. But only S$1,566 of that balance was "current (not past due)"; S$248,925 was 1-30 days late and S$17,264 more than 90 days late (63% provided for). The filing says the remaining balances "were subsequently settled", and a separate S$17,719 bad-debt write-off was taken in the half. Worth watching, given how small the revenue base is.
- Revenue depends on a few clients. Customers each contributing over 10% of revenue accounted for about 51% of total revenue (60% a year earlier). Losing one or two contracts would swing results sharply.
- A small inconsistency in the filing itself. The summary table near the front of the 6-K prints a loss per share of S$0.26; the financial statements and the XBRL data show S$0.13, which matches the loss divided by the stated share count. This report uses S$0.13. The MD&A text also gives a slightly different operating cash outflow (S$1,454,500) than the cash flow statement (S$1,528,674); the gap equals the interest received, which the statement classifies under investing activities.
- Leadership change. CEO and Chairman Kenneth Tan resigned with his notice period ending October 3, 2026. CFO Abdul Latif Bin Zainal became interim CEO and interim Chairman from October 4 while remaining CFO, so one person now holds all three roles until a permanent hire.
Takeaway: BeLive's revenue nearly doubled, but the growth leaned on one-time installation fees rather than recurring subscriptions, and most of the narrower loss comes from last year's IPO-related share charge disappearing. The underlying loss of about S$1.4 million per half is still more than twice revenue, against S$7.1 million of cash.
Outlook
The filing gives no revenue or profit guidance. Management points to new initiatives: a March 2026 partnership with COL Web to co-develop microdrama content on BeLive's streaming infrastructure, a February 2026 advisory tie-up with Istana Partners aimed at Singapore small businesses, and a further subsidiary, BeLive AI Create, formed on August 12, 2026. None of these show up in revenue yet beyond the S$88,023 from the content studio.
The numbers to watch in the full-year 20-F are whether subscription and server fees start growing faster (a sign that this half's installation projects turn into ongoing revenue), whether the S$1.4-1.5 million half-year cash burn holds or improves, and whether the going-concern language persists. At the current pace the company has cash well beyond 12 months, but with revenue still a fraction of overheads, the path to break-even depends on growth well above this half's, or further cost cuts, and possibly new financing. The interim leadership arrangement adds uncertainty about strategy until a permanent CEO is named.